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Abstract
This paper proves a nonparametric identification result for a stochastic dynamic discrete-
choice game of incomplete information. The joint distribution of the private information and
the stage game payoffs of the players are both assumed unknown for the econometrician and
the private information across alternatives is allowed to have different distributions and be
dependent. This setup poses a circularity problem in the identification strategy that has not
been solved for dynamic games. This paper proposes a solution through exclusion restrictions
and implied properties of the unknown functions. Under the assumptions that the distribu-
tion of the private shocks for the outside option is known and the outside option’s shocks are
independent of other shocks, the results jointly identify the stage game payoffs and the joint
distribution of the private information.
Keywords: dynamic multinomial choice games, dynamic Markov game, Markov decision pro-
cesses, multiple choice models, econometric identification, incomplete information, dynamic
discrete choice, discrete decision process, decision model.
JEL Classification: C14, C33, C51, C57.
I Introduction
Discrete-time dynamic programming games are particularly attractive to estimate empirical models. These
games can be represented by structural models with a finite number of players who are forward-looking
and choose among available alternatives to optimize their own outcomes. The players face an individual
decision-making process in which their intertemporal outcomes are affected by other players’ actions and
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random events that depend on joint actions of all players. Models with similar features can be found in
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), Hotz and Miller (1993), Rust (1987)
and a review of related literature in Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes (2007) and Aguirregabiria and
Mira (2010).
This paper studies a stochastic dynamic discrete-choice game of incomplete information with hetero-
geneous players in an infinite horizon set up1 and proves a new nonparametric identification result. The
game has at least a dynamic equilibrium and the players know all the game’s objects but the econometri-
cian does not. To estimate similar models, the literature has proposed different identification strategies
but there are still no results for dynamic polychotomous games with both, the stage game payoffs and the
distribution of the shocks, unknown.2 If this type of structural models are estimated under the wrong
assumptions their estimators are usually not consistent and the policy implications derived from their
results might not be supported by the observations.
The new nonparametric identification result in this paper allows for unknown stage game payoff func-
tions for all but one alternative and also unknown joint distribution of the private shocks with shocks that
can be dependent across alternatives3 and have different marginal distributions. The stage game playoffs
for the alternatives are allowed to be different and the outside option’s payoff is interpreted as a reference
of profitability in exogenous alternatives that are unaffected by the players moves. The outside option’s
payoff is assumed determined by state variables that also have an impact on the stage game payoffs of
other alternatives, which considers its interpretation as an alternative of reference. There is at least one
exclusion restriction for each players’ alternatives but one, the econometrician has full information about
this alternative (i.e. the “outside option”), and the private shocks are independent over time and across
players.4
In similar setups, there are known nonparametric non-identification results (see Rust 1994 and Magnac
and Thesmar 2002), but in this paper the sources of identification depart from the available ones in the
literature, hence there are not contradictory results. Some key different assumptions are for instance
a stage game payoff for the outside option that cannot be 0 everywhere (or in general a constant) and
unobservable shocks that are independent of observable state variables.
In this paper, the identification result is constructive under the assumption that all observations corre-
spond to the same Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). To the best of my knowledge there are not results
on the existence of MPE in stochastic dynamic games with unbounded returns and a generalization of the
proof of existence is beyond the scope of this paper.5 Therefore this paper follows the same approach of
the literature that studies the prolific applications of similar games, that is, assuming the existence of a
MPE (see for instance Bajari, Benkard, and Levin 2007).
Despite a theoretical gap on the existence of a MPE in the setup of this game, there are results for
dynamic discrete choice models that are useful in this research because they must also be valid under
1If the number of players is 1 the model has similarities to the setup in Rust (1987).
2Even under i.i.d. assumptions over the shocks.
3Only the outside option’s private shock is assumed independent of the shocks of other alternatives.
4The specification of the objects for the “outside option” can be selected based on econometric methods applied to a sample
of payoffs for exogenous alternatives of reference.
5A brief review of the literature on this topic can be found in the Appendix.
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a MPE. For instance, Bhattacharya and Majumdar (1989) and Norets (2010) propose conditions under
which optimal unbounded lifetime payoffs satisfy a Bellman equation and there is an optimal Markovian
policy that solves such equation. Similar conditions are useful for this proposed game because they allow
to construct a “pseudo-game” where players’ beliefs about the behavior of other players are given by the
players’ choice probabilities under the MPE actually played. Thus in equilibrium, each player problem
can be seen as a game against nature. The assumption that a unique MPE is played does not prevent the
researcher from using the result in this paper to investigate the possibility of multiple equilibriums, but
this would require better databases and information about the correspondence between the samples and
the different equilibriums.
Among the related literature on identification of discrete choice models, there are papers that focus
on static setups such as Manski (1975, 1985) and Matzkin (1993). Other literature such as Magnac and
Thesmar (2002) study dynamic discrete decision processes under the assumption that the distribution
of unobservables is known and propose nonparametric identification results for the payoffs. Heckman
and Navarro (2007) focus on semiparametric identification of structural dynamic discrete choice mod-
els applied to the choice of a treatment time and its dynamic effects. Bajari, Chernozhukov, Hong, and
Nekipelov (2009) prove a nonparametric identification result for period payoffs in a stationary, infinite-
horizon game given that the discount factor, the distribution of the choice-specific shocks and the period
payoff of one alternative are known. Aguirregabiria (2005) and Aguirregabiria (2010) propose a non-
parametric identification strategy of the effects of a counterfactual policy intervention in the context of
dynamic discrete decision processes. Blevins (2014) studies conditions for nonparametric identification
of dynamic decision processes with discrete alternatives and a nested continuous choice assuming that
there are exclusion restrictions for all alternatives, the period payoff of one alternative is known and the
conditional median of the unobservable states in differences is 0.
Kasahara and Shimotsu (2009) study dynamic discrete choice models with unobserved persistent state
variables that induce dynamic selection on unobservable characteristics. Under a Markov framework,
the selection problem can be reduced to the identification of finite mixtures (over transition densities
and conditional choice probabilities) and Kasahara and Shimotsu (2009) propose sufficient conditions to
identify the components of the mixture. Kasahara and Shimotsu’s method is meant to be applied before
proceeding with the identification of the payoffs and choice-specific value functions of a standard model,
i.e. a model without selection on unobserved and persistent state variables. In this sense, the identification
result in Kasahara and Shimotsu (2009) could be used jointly with the methodology developed in this
paper and cannot replace it.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II places the contribution of this paper among the related
literature. Section III describes the setup of the model, the problem from a player’ point of view and ex-
amples. The identification arguments are organized under a constructive approach along with the player’s
problem. Section IV contains the identification strategy and there is a brief description of the main ar-
guments at the beginning of the section. The identification strategy is separated in two broad “steps”,
section IV.1 develops the arguments to identify the choice specific value functions and section IV.2 uses
the objects identified in section IV.1 to derive the identification of the joint distribution of the private
shocks and the stage game payoff functions. Finally, section V summarizes the conclusions and general
thoughts about the contribution of the paper and section V provides the proofs of the propositions stated
in the main text.
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II Related literature
The game has a finite number of players who each period choose among a given number of alternatives
to optimize their individual outcome. When there is only one player, the model is similar to Rust (1987,
1994). The actions of a player have effects on other players’ outcomes and the joint actions of the players
affect the future evolution of certain observable state variables. In this game, the unobservable states do
not produce selection, but there are not restrictions on the possibility of extending the model to add other
unobservables that can generate dynamic selection mechanisms. See for instance Abbring (2010) for a
review of models with dynamic selection.
The main contribution of this paper is to prove that under some modifications of the standard setup the
model can be nonparametrically identified when all the stage-game payoff functions but one and the joint
distribution of the unobservable shocks are unknown for the econometrician. Some particular assump-
tions on the distribution of the shocks are popular in the literature because they simplify the identification
and estimation of the model, for example normally distributed shocks are assumed in Keane and Wolpin
(1994), Imai, Jain, and Ching (2009), Norets (2009) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003); while
extreme value i.i.d. shocks are assumed in the nested fixed point estimator of Rust (1987) and the condi-
tional choice probability estimator of Hotz and Miller (1993). Assuming that the shocks are i.i.d. extreme
value of type I allows closed form solutions for the probabilities of choosing an alternative which reduces
considerably the computational burden. The simplifications have a cost, in the later example the restrictive
property of independence of irrelevant alternatives holds for static models,6 while in the dynamic frame-
work the property can be somehow avoided only through the continuation values of the choice-specific
value functions, thus it might still be introducing a bias in the estimation.
Norets and Tang (2013) propose a semiparametric estimator for dynamic binary choice models that
does not require the distribution of unobservables to be known, but such unknown distribution is not iden-
tified. In their setup when the distribution of the unobservable states is unknown, per-period payoffs and
counterfactual conditional choice probabilities are only set identified (even under parametric restrictions),
thus Norets and Tang (2013) characterize the identified sets for these objects. Their estimation experi-
ments show that the parametric assumptions about the distribution of the unobserved states can affect the
estimates of per-period payoffs.
There are several estimators with their associated identification results available for dynamic games,
however to the best of my knowledge, none of them have nonparametric point-identified results when there
are unknown stage game payoff functions and the joint distribution of the unobservable states is unknown.
Unless otherwise noticed, the following literature studies the problem assuming that the period payoffs
are parametric and the distribution of the shocks is known.
Rust (1987) proposes a nested fixed point algorithm to estimate a parametric dynamic decision prob-
lem by maximum likelihood, and Hotz and Miller (1993) develop a two-step approach that avoids solving
the full dynamic optimization problem. Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007) create a two-step estima-
tor for entry/exit games using the returns actually earned by the firms. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002)
propose a nested pseudo likelihood estimator that iterates over consistent estimates of conditional choice
6Under i.i.d. extreme value of type I shocks the ratio of probabilities of choosing any two alternatives is independent of the
features or the existence of a third alternative.
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probabilities and has the estimators of Rust (1987) and Hotz and Miller (1993) as two extreme cases.
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) generalize the nested pseudo likelihood estimator in Aguirregabiria and
Mira (2002) to games with a finite number of players. Kasahara and Shimotsu (2012) propose modi-
fications to the nested pseudo likelihood algorithm to improve its convergence properties. Pesendorfer
and Schmidt-Dengler (2003) study the identification problem under the assumption that the profitability
shocks are i.i.d. standard normals and propose an estimation procedure for infinite horizon Markovian
games. The estimator in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003) does not require a second stage of
maximum likelihood estimation, nor a nested fixed point algorithm.
Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) generalize the simulation-based estimators in Hotz, Miller, Sanders,
and Smith (1994) to a multiple agent setting and use inequality restrictions to construct the estimator.7
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) study a class of asymptotic least squares estimators for dynamic
discrete games defined by equilibrium conditions and provide a unified framework for these estimators
(among which include those proposed by Hotz and Miller (1993) and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002)).
Srisuma and Linton (2012) generalize the methodology of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008)
to a continuous observable state space when the transition distribution of the observed state variables is
not specified parametrically. Srisuma and Linton (2012) show that the policy value functions are solu-
tions to some type II integral equations with a well-posed inverse problem under conditions that ensure
bounded real-valued functions. Srisuma (2013) estimator is obtained by minimizing the distance between
distributions of actions observed from the data and predicted by a pseudo-model without needing to solve
for the underlying dynamic optimization problem. Srisuma (2013) proposes a two step estimator, in the
first step the nonparametric beliefs are estimated and used to simulate the best responses implied by the
pseudo-model, and in the second stage the fit of the model is evaluated comparing the simulated distri-
butions with the nonparametric distributions under a suitable metric. The dynamic games that can be
estimated by Srisuma (2013)’s estimator are required to have a unique solution almost surely and the
result for the pseudo-game is obtained under conditions that ensure bounded real-valued functions.
Regarding the advances in nonparametric identification for dynamic decision models, Magnac and
Thesmar (2002) study dynamic discrete decision processes under the assumption that the distribution
of unobservables is known and propose nonparametric identification results for the payoffs. Heckman
and Navarro (2007) consider semiparametric identification of primitive structural functions when the per
period payoff does not depend on the agent’s choices of the contemporaneous period.8 The time in this
model is finite and the researcher observes agents’ actions, some state variables, the earnings, a compo-
nent of the costs and “latent factors”.9 There is an assumed informational structure that combined with
the observed earnings and latent factors allows for the nonparametrically identification at infinity of the
primitive structural functions and the distribution of the unobservables without solving or using the whole
structural model. In a second step, the identification of the full structural model is achieved sequentially
applying arguments of identification at infinity starting from the last period and using the objects identi-
fied in the first step. Other literature on finite time models is Taber (2000) where the continuation value
associated with one of the alternatives is known and it is possible to apply an argument of identification
at infinity to identify utilities up to a monotonic transformation of the observables.
7Srisuma (2013) points out that this type of estimator constructed on inequality restrictions might lose identifying information.
8The per period payoff is given by earnings net of the costs.
9The “latent factors” are not state variables.
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Aguirregabiria (2010) studies conditions for the nonparametric identification of the choice probability
functions and the integrated value functions before and after policy interventions, when primitives of the
model such as the payoff functions are not identified. The counterfactual experiments that can be evalu-
ated are those for which the researcher knows how the policy affects the period payoffs, i.e. the amount of
change in the utility function per alternative. In Aguirregabiria (2010) the per period payoff of an alterna-
tive is assumed to be the sum of two random variables that are independent conditioning on the observed
states, one of these variables is the outcome which is assumed observable and can directly identify the
“outcome function”. The model in Aguirregabiria (2010) has a finite time and the identification proof is
recursive, but there is a proof for an infinite horizon version of the model in Aguirregabiria (2005). In
this later case, the identification argument requires both, unobservable states with zero conditional median
and an unique solution for a fixed point mapping of the conditional choice probabilities. This identifi-
cation strategy can hardly be useful in dynamic games because it is known that even under parametric
assumptions there are values of the structural parameters for which the games usually have multiple equi-
libriums. The nonparametric identification in this paper is based on a different strategy which does not
require uniqueness of the possible equilibriums, the strategy only requires that the observations belong to
the same equilibrium.
Blevins (2014) studies conditions for nonparametric identification in dynamic decision models where
an agent chooses firstly among discrete alternatives and secondly a nested continuous amount. Blevins
(2014)’s nonparametric identification of the distribution of the shocks (in differences) requires exclusion
restrictions for each alternative, also special regressors that must be conditionally independent across time,
and shocks in differences with 0 conditional median. The payoff functions are assumed bounded and the
identification result is partial if the errors in differences are unbounded or have bounds that exceed the
bounds of the choice specific value functions in differences. The assumptions in this paper are different to
the ones in Blevins (2014) and the identification strategy can deal with polychotomous dynamic discrete
games even if there are not exclusion restrictions for all alternatives or a known median for the shocks in
differences. Furthermore, in this paper the payoffs are unbounded and the number of players can be larger
than 1.
Among the related literature, most of the advances in nonparametric identification have been done
for dynamic decision processes but there is a noticeable exception. Bajari, Chernozhukov, Hong, and
Nekipelov (2009) prove the nonparametric identification of period payoffs for a stationary, infinite-horizon
game with known distribution of the choice-specific shocks, discount factor and period payoffs for one
alternative of reference.
III The model
Consider a dynamic discrete game of incomplete information with a finite numberN ≥ 1 of players and an
infinite horizon.10 Denote random variables by capital letters and their realizations by the corresponding
lowercase letters. Every period t an observable state of the game S·t is realized, player i observes his
information Iit, ιit ∈ I and takes an action, Ait. For instance, player’s action a might be “offer a product
or service of type a”, or “make a risky investment of type a”. The set of actions isA = {0, . . . , J}, where
10If N = 1 the game can be seen as against “nature”, or as a dynamic decision process.
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0 is the outside option whose stage game payoffs do not depend on the alternatives chosen by the players.
The game is dynamic because the actions that players take every period t affect both their immediate
payoffs and the evolution of the state variables, which end up influencing future actions and payoffs of all
players.
Zita denotes random attributes of alternative a 6= 0 for player i at time t with zita ∈ Za ⊂ Rdza and
Zita affects the stage game payoff function of player i for alternative a only. Every period player i observes
the random attributes of his alternatives Zit· = (Z ′it1, . . . , Z ′itJ)
′ before choosing one of them.11 Let a
subindex −i indicate that all elements are included but the corresponding to i. From player i’s point of
view, the other players’ attributes, Z−it·, are not known at t but they can be learned when the competitors
release this information at t + 1, so assume that the distribution of Z−it· is common knowledge.12 The
attributes of alternative a = 0 are denoted by Yt, they are common knowledge, invariant across players
and may affect the payoff functions of other alternatives a 6= 0.13
In order to motivate some of the assumptions, the reader can find the following example of a “banking
game” useful. The example is divided in parts along with the presentation of the model. The model is
flexible enough to be useful for the analysis of different industries, but the “banking game” highlights
some of its main advantages, i.e. there is no need of providing parametric assumptions on key objects.14
Therefore, the researcher can consider the the intertemporal complexity of the banking business without
reducing it to some particular parametric assumptions. The business of the banks is mainly intertemporal,
they pay costs of screening today to evaluate potential customers who later might default on their loans.
A considerable part of the screening information that the banks produce for internal use becomes cheaper
and available to their competitors. Moreover, under different “states” the banks could find it profitable to
allocate certain amount of loanable funds to a selected group of individuals that require a minimum of
screening costs, or could be willing to compete through their screening technologies and interest rates to
broaden their range of lending services and attract new customers.
11The dot notation “B·”means that all its relevant k = 1, . . . ,K elements are included, i.e. B· = (B′1, . . . , B′K)′. The
notation is used when there are additional subscripts that need to be specified, such as t, and it is omitted when there are not
ambiguities.
12The final prices of the products are not considered attributes, they are endogenous in the sense that if the player chooses to
offer product a, he will be able of producing certain quantity during the period and adjusting the price in order to sell it.
13Note that Yt is also a state variable, but it is not included in S·t because it plays a particular role in the identification strategy.
14The reduced form stage game payoff functions and the joint distribution of the shocks that might affect the payoffs.
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Example 1 (A banking game). Consider a group of N commercial banks that are competing in
the market of loans. Let the sample contain a group of variables relevant to classify the lending
services of the banks into categories. For instance, the banks can grant different types of loans
with different requirements to be approved, costs of screening and target populations. In principle,
any group of categories that provides a complete classification of the lending services of the banks
can be useful to construct the set of alternatives A. But to keep the example simple, assume that
there are only two possible categories that correspond to two types of loans offered, real estate (lr)
and consumer loans (lc). Thus, the set of alternatives for the banks is A = {0, lr, lc}, where 0
denotes the outside option.
Every period a bank has a certain amount of loanable funds which can be allocated among the
alternatives in A. The consequent changes in the portfolio of the banks reveal the outcomes of
these choices.
The information of player i is summarized in the vector Iit =
(
S′it, S
′
−it, Y
′
t , Z
′
it·, ε
′
it·
)′, which includes
the observable state of the game for player i, Sit with sit ∈ S, and for all other players but i, S−it, the
attribute of the outside option, Yt, with yt ∈ Y , the attributes of player i’s other alternatives Zit·, with
zit· ∈ Z and the payoff relevant private shocks εit· = (εit0, . . . , εitJ)′, with realizations it· ∈ RJ+1. The
shocks εit· can be interpreted as private information with respect to the ability of the players to realize
gains in each alternative. The distribution function of εit· is denoted by q and assumed known to the
players, but unknown to the researcher.
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Example 2 (A banking game, cont.). Regarding the state variables of the banking game, consider
those that can be affected by the type of loans granted and their corresponding target populations.
These state variables can be for instance the number of branches, ATMs, the geographic presence,
the share of highly qualified staff and the number of employees per branch.
An additional state variable to consider is the default rate. It is possible that similar screening tech-
nologies are available for all banks and its selection is endogenous to the players’ problem. Thus
the default rate of each bank could be affected by the types of loans granted and the competition
for such loans.
The passive interest rates that a bank must pay in order to increase its loanable funds may also be
considered a state variables. Indicators of bancarization, such as the percentage of people with
certain access to credit lines, are also relevant state variables in some cases. This is a proxy for
potential costumers that could likely be granted a profitable loan with low screening costs. The
indicators of bancarization might grow if the banks are willing to grant loans to clients with scarce
credit history.a If a bank performs a customized screening to an individual that is new for the set
of banks, this bank might pay some additional costs, but the whole set of banks will benefit from
the information about the performance of this new client. This argument explain why this type of
state variable is relevant across banks and is affected by all players’ moves.
Finally, there is a group of state variables that are less likely to be affected by the banks’ choices, but
they may instead affect the choices. Among these variables one can consider the type of ownership
(public or private, foreign or local), and its relative size (i.e. large, medium or small).
aIn this case, the expected income for having new customers or charging higher interest rates should compensate
additional screening costs and increased previsions for non-performing loans.
Every period t, player i observes Iit, takes an action ait ∈ A and receives a stage game payoff u˘ait
that does not depend on S−it, i.e. u˘ait (Sit, Yt, Zitait , A−it, εitait).
Assumption A. (Exclusion restrictions). The stage game payoff of player i at time t, u˘ait , depends on
Sit, Yt, Zitait , A−it and εitait when ait 6= 0. When ait = 0, u˘ait depends on Yt and εit0 only.
Assumption A has a simple interpretation, if the researcher accounts for the effects of Sit, Yt, Zita and
A−it on the stage game payoff of alternative a at time t, then the variables included in S−it and Z−it· do
not affect the payoffs of alternative a. Assumption A also ensures that u˘0 is not affected by the moves of
the players, and this is a characteristic feature of the outside option of the game. Equation (1) informally
summarizes these exclusion restrictions.
u˘ait (·) =
{
u˘ait (sit, yt, zitait , a−i, ita) if ait 6= 0
u˘0 (yt, it0) otherwise
(1)
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Example 3 (A banking game, cont.). It is reasonable to assume that the banks have access to
information on the performance of their own portfolios before it is released to the public. Such
information can be compared to market trends or forecasts for competitors’ variables that are al-
ready public to construct attributes for the alternatives, zilst and zilct for all i. The attributes can be
proxies for the ability of a bank to do business in each alternative or for the ability to discriminate
and attract applicants. For instance, some attributes can be the variation in non-performing loans
(per alternative) minus the corresponding expected variation for competitor banks, a comparison
of the loan to value ratio for mortgages or the denial rates between a bank and its competitors.
In general, due to regulatory requirements each bank foresees possible losses associated to bad
performance of its portfolio of loans and make provisions which need to be adjusted according
to the new available information.a For instance, some loan loss indicators are non-performing
loans, allowances for loan losses, expected loan losses and net loan charge-offs. Changes in the
percentages of these indicators (by loan type) that are not explained by the public state variables
can be interpreted as “surprises” that have an impact on the stage game payoffs. Thus, they can be
random attributes per alternative.
Other group of attributes can be constructed with interactions between indicators of performance
of a bank and proxies for market opportunities weighted by the location of its branches. For in-
stance, interactions between the growth of granted loans by type and indexes of consumption or
the price volatility of the houses weighted by the location of the branches.
aA group of these indicators (by loan type) are required to be reported by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC).
Assumption B ensures that there is enough variability in S−it for each si ∈ Si.
Assumption B. (Support condition). For any t, the conditional distribution of the states S−it given
sit ∈ Si, has at least (J + 1)N−1 points in its support with probability 1.
The probability measure of (S′·t, Y ′t , Z ′·t·)
′ is denoted by G, and assumption B introduces restrictions
on G which are useful for the identification of u˘·.
Assumption C. (Additive separability). For all a ∈ A, u˘a is additively separable,
u˘a (·, εita) = ua (·) + εita.
The additive separability of the random private shocks in assumption C is a standard simplification that
is particularly useful to model players’ choices.
Assumption D. (Known outside option payoff). u0 is a known function.
Assumption D ensures that u0 is known, which provides information to identify the unknown stage game
payoffs of other alternatives in levels. Assumption E imposes restrictions on q, the density function of
εit·.
Assumption E. (Distribution of private information). For all i and t, εit· has a distribution with density
q. Moreover, the distribution function of εit0, denoted by q0, is known.
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When A contains more than 2 elements, the literature usually assumes a known distribution of all
shocks (up to some parameters’ values). Other standard assumptions are shocks equally distributed and
conditionally independent across alternatives. These assumptions seem unreasonable, in particular for
applications involving alternatives that represent different types of investment opportunities and risks.
A noticeable feature of the setup in this paper is that q−0, the density of εit,−0, is assumed unknown
and the shocks εitj are allowed to be dependent among alternatives j > 0. The specifications of the choice
specific payoffs of alternatives other than 0 are also unknown, but the outside option’s payoff is assumed
known and observable with some delay. The outside option represents the gains that can be obtained
from exogenous alternatives of reference and under the given assumptions, its payoff can be estimated in
advance.
This paper proposes a different identification strategy that uses the available information on the outside
option and allows for the nonparametric specification of the remaining unknown objects of the model.
Therefore, it is in principle possible to check results on policy implications without imposing parametric
assumptions on key objects.
Assumption F. (Stationarity). (S′·t, Y ′t , Z ′·t·, ε′·t·)′ is stationary.
The players’ actions taken at t− 1 become public at the beginning of period t and affect the evolution
of S·t through a known first order Markov process. The states evolve as Markov chains of first degree,
while the whole set of private shocks εit· are independent and identically distributed across time and
players. The new realizations of the public state variables and the new private information are revealed
at the beginning of every period.
Assumption G. (Identical distributions). S′it|(S′it−1, S′−it−1, Y ′t−1, Ait−1, A′−it−1), Y ′t |Y ′t−1,
Z ′it·|(S′it, S′−it, Y ′t ) and εit· are identically distributed across i and t.
Example 4 (A banking game, cont.). The model assumes that the banks can invest in exogenous
alternative activities summarized by the “outside option”, with attribute yt. For instance, yt can
be the return of some procyclical, liquid and risky financial portfolio of reference. The stage
game payoff for the outside option is the same for all players, but the strategies under which each
player could pursue alternative investments can be different, and the variable that accounts for such
differences is the private information εi0t.
Under assumption E, the distribution function of εit0, q0, is known and can be estimated from
the historic returns of portfolios with different compositions and ex-antes similar risk, or from the
time series residuals between expected and actual returns of the portfolio of reference.
TheZit· are shocks to the alternatives that are independent across t and i conditional on the observable
states S·t, Yt. The players know the distributions of the private shocks εit· and the attributes Zit·. Besides,
the conditional independence assumptions in assumption H ensure that the players’ inferences for ε−it·
and Z−it· cannot improve with their private information.
Assumption H. (Independence). For all t, i, k 6= i and h < t,
S′·t ⊥ (S′·h, Y ′h, Z ′·h, ε′·h·, A′·h)|(S′·t−1, Y ′t−1, A′·t−1), Yt ⊥ (S′·h, Y ′h, Z ′·h, ε′·h·, A′·h)|Yt−1,
Z ′it· ⊥ (S′·h, Y ′h, Z ′·h, ε′·h·, A′·h)|(S′·t, Y ′t ) and Z ′it· ⊥ (Z ′kt·, ε′kt·)|(S′·t, Y ′t ). εit· is independent across i, t
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and with respect to (S′·t, Y ′t , Z ′·t). Finally, for all t and a 6= 0, the outside option’s private shock, ε·t0 is
independent of ε·ta.
The random factors that affect the stage game payoffs of the players for alternatives j > 0, εit,−0, are
likely to be related with each other. Assumptions G and H let εit,−0 be independent of εit0 and stationary
with a distribution invariant across players, and unknown for the econometrician.
Considering the Markovian structure of the game, the relevant information for player i at t is inde-
pendent of any history beyond t − 1. Then, for convenience and clarity, the time index is omitted and
the superscript ‘◦’ points out next period variables. Under assumptions F to H, let the Markov transi-
tion probability function of Y be FY ◦|Y . In addition, denote by FZ|S·Y , FS◦|S·Y A· , Q, Q0 and Q−0 the
transition probability functions for Zit·, S·t, εit·, εit0, and εit,−0 respectively.
Assumption I. The functions FY ◦|Y , FZ|S·Y , FS◦· |S·Y A· are directly identified from the observations.
The players are risk neutral and do not observe the actions or private information of other players nor
the future realization of the relevant variables. Therefore, they choose among alternatives based on their
beliefs, which determine their expected payoffs and are correct in equilibrium.
Assumption J. (Strategies and single equilibrium). There exist at least a Markov perfect equilibrium in
the game which is symmetric in unobservable variables. Among these possible equilibriums, only one
is played. The players follow (stationary) Markov strategies σ : I → A and their beliefs about other
players’ strategies are correct.
Under assumption J, the equilibrium choice probabilities of the players are identified from the players’
actions and the observable variables. Assumption J implies that if Iit = Iih, player i’s actions at periods
t and h are the same, and if Iit = Ikt, player i and k’s actions at period t are the same. Under player i’s
beliefs, σ− = (σ, . . . , σ) : IN−1 → AN−1 and assumptions F to J, the transition probability function for
S·t from a player’s perspective is given by
FS◦· |S·Y Ai(s
◦
· |s·, y, ai) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
FS◦· |S·Y AiA−i(s
◦
· |s·, y, ai, a−i)
Prob {σ− (ι−i) = a−i| si, s−i, y} .
(2)
Then, in equilibrium, the transition probability function of Iit under beliefs σ− is
FI◦i |Ii Ai = FZ◦· |S◦· Y ◦ FS◦· |S·Y Ai FY ◦|Y Q. (3)
Let u¯a in equation (4) define the conditional expectation of ua over the moves of players other than i and
note that the dependence of σ− is left implicit. For all a 6= 0,
u¯a (Si, S−i, Y, Zia) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
ua (Si, Y, Zia, a−i) Prob {σ− (ι−i) = a−i|Si, S−i, Y }
= E [ua (Si, Y, Zia, a−i)|Si, S−i, Y, Zia, a] . (4)
In equilibrium, player imaximizes his expected payoffs given σ− and Iit. Under regularity conditions for
the existence of this maximum (implied by assumption J) and provided assumption F, player i’s discounted
expected payoffs can be written as a dynamic programming problem in its recursive form. Indeed,
V (Ii) = max
a∈A
{u¯a (Si, S−i, Y, Zia) + εia + β E [V (I◦i )| Ii, a]} (5)
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for some known β < 1 and u¯0 = u0 according to assumptions A and C. Now, for all a ∈ A with a 6= 0,
define the choice-specific value functions, va, as in equation (6).
va (Si, S−i, Y, Zia) = u¯a (Si, S−i, Y, Zia) + β E [V (I◦i )|S·, Y, a] . (6)
Notice that the continuation value in equation (6) can be rewritten in terms of va.
va (Si, S−i, Y, Zia) = u¯a (Si, S−i, Y, Zia)
+ β E
[
max
a∈A
{
va
(
S◦i , S
◦
−i, Y
◦, Z◦ia
)
+ ε◦ia
}∣∣∣∣S·, Y, a] . (7)
The outside option is assumed to be a benchmark of possible gains that the players are missing for being
involved in the game. Once that a player chooses the outside option, it is assumed that he will do so
indefinitely.15 Under assumptions A and C to H the stage game payoff for the outside option and the
distribution of its shocks are known and independent so the choice-specific value function for the outside
option is given in equation (8).
v0 (Y ) = u0 (Y ) + β E [v0 (Y
◦) + ε◦i0|Y ] . (8)
The policy function of player i can be characterized as follows
σ (Ii) = arg max
a∈A
{va (Si, S−i, Y, Zia) + εia} . (9)
The probability that player i chooses alternative a is denoted by Pa (Si, S−i, Y, Zi·), and this probability
can be identified from the observations because the players’ moves and
(
S′i, S
′
−i, Y
′, Z ′i·
)
are observables.
Besides,
Pa (Si, S−i, Y, Zi·) = E [I {σ (Ii) = a}|Si, S−i, Y, Zi·] , (10)
with the expectation on the right hand side of equation (10) taken over the unobservable private shocks.
Under assumptions C and J, equation (10) can be rewritten as
Pa (si, s−i, y, zi·)
= Prob
{
va (Si, S−i, Y, Zia) + εia ≥ max
k∈A,k 6=a
[vk (Si, S−i, Y, Zik) + εik]
∣∣∣∣ si, s−i, y, zi·} . (11)
To shorten the notation, let ∆ε(a)i =
(
∆0ε
(a)
i , . . . ,∆Jε
(a)
i
)
∈ RJ be the vector of shocks in differences,16
where ∆kε
(a)
i = εik − εia. Similarly, let ∆v(a) : SN × Y × Z → RJ ,17 then
Pa (si, s−i, y, zi·) = Prob
{
∆ε(a) ≤ ∆v(a) (si, s−i, y, zi·)
}
.
In view of assumptions E, F and H, for all a 6= 0,J , the right hand side of equation (11) becomes
Prob
{
∆ε(a) ≤ ∆v(a)(·)
}
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∆0v(a)+a
−∞
...
∫ ∆Jv(a)+a
−∞
q (0, . . . , a, . . . , J) d0 . . . da−1da+1 . . . dJda.
(12)
15It is possible to accommodate “re-entry” allowing it in an additional alternative, i.e. suspending operations.
16The element εik − εik is always excluded in the vector ∆ε(k)i .
17Where ∆v(a) has functional elements, ∆kv(a) = va − vk.
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Let P = (P0, P1, ..., PJ) be the cumulative distribution of ∆ε(a), such that for all a ∈ A,
Pa (Si, S−i, Y, Zi·) = Pa
(
∆v(a) (Si, S−i, Y, Zi·)
)
. (13)
At this point, the main elements of the setup were presented. The next section describes the identification
strategy from an arbitrary player’ point of view.
IV Identification
The identification argument starts with the assumption that q0 and u0 are known, so the choice specific
value function for the outside option that satisfies equation (8), i.e. v∗0 , can be identified. Under certain
conditions this unique solution v∗0 is continuous and unbounded, which becomes useful in the next steps.
The identification of the remaining v∗j requires a different strategy because equation (7) depends on the
unknown q and uj for all j ≥ 1. The next object to identify is P ∗, followed by the choice specific value
functions in differences, ∆v∗(j)’s, and the identification of the v∗j ’s in levels through v∗0 .
The identification of P ∗ is firstly achieved on a subspace of its domain using the already identified
v∗0 and properties derived for the v∗j ’s. The partially identified P ∗, exclusion restrictions on the Zij’s
and properties of P ∗ are useful to identify the ∆v∗(j)’s on a larger subspace. Then, the identification
strategy uses the partially identified ∆v∗(j)’s to span the domain of P ∗ and complete its identification.
The invertibitily of P ∗ allows to fully identify the ∆v∗(j)’s and finally, the v∗j ’s in levels are identified
through v∗0 .
An additional proof establishes that the unknown q∗ can be identified from the distribution of the
private shocks in differences (in particular from P ∗0 ) and the independence of ε·t0 with q0 known. At this
point all the objects in equation (7) are identified with the exception of the uj’s. In this final step, a key
element is assumption B which provides conditions for the support of the conditional distribution of the
states S−i|si. Thus, the uj’s can be identified through a linear system of equations.
IV.1 Identification of v∗ and P ∗
Under assumption J, assumption K provides additional conditions to ensure that given some uj’s and Q,
the vj’s are continuous and have a unique solution. This result is stated in lemma 1 and its proof is in
section V. Lemma 2 specializes the result for v0 in equation (8) which can be solved (independently of V )
for some given u0 and q0. The particular assumptions required for the elements of Ii are irrelevant to prove
these first results, so to keep the notation simpler the results are given in terms of the general transition
probability function in equation (4), i.e. FI◦|I,A, and its density with respect to a generic measure %,
fI◦|I,A.18
The functions u˘j’s are allowed to be unbounded and then a key element to prove the results is the
choice of a suitable norm that defines a particular Banach space. Let a function w be involved in the
18The subindexes are omitted here to simplify the notation.
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definition of Bwα , the normed linear space of wα-bounded measurable functions on R. A real-valued
function υ in Bwα satisfies
‖υ‖wα ≡ sup
ι∈I
|υ (ι)|w (ι)−α <∞.
for some positive integer α. The function wα is assumed to be known and chosen such that assumption K
holds. The conditions in assumption K and the main arguments to prove uniqueness and continuity of V
are similar to those found in Herna´ndez-Lerma (1999), Lippman (1975) and Norets (2010).
Assumption K.
i. I is a nonempty, complete, and separable metric space
ii. For all j ∈ A, u˘j (ι, a−i) is continuous in ι ∈ I
iii. Prob{a−i|ι} is continuous in ι ∈ I
iv. There exists a continuous function w : I → R, such that for all ι ∈ I, 1 ≤ w(ι) <∞
v. There exists a positive integer α such that for ˙˘uj (ι) ≡ maxa−i∈A−i |u˘j (ι, a−i) |
‖max
j∈A
˙˘uj‖wα <∞
vi. There is a scalar b ∈ (0,∞) such that for all ι ∈ I, n = 1, 2, . . . α
max
j∈A
∫
w(ι◦)nfI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι, a)%(dι◦) ≤ (w(ι) + b)n
vii. For all j ∈ A, F I◦|I,A is weakly continuous on I, i.e. for all h in the set of continuous and bounded
functions on I, Cb(I),
∫
h (ι◦)F I◦|I,A(dι◦|ι, j) is continuous.
Considering assumptions A and H note that the notation in assumption K is general, in the sense that
Prob{a−i|Ii} in assumption K.iii makes reference to Prob{a−i|Si, S−i, Y } because the private informa-
tion of player i is unknown for other players and then it does not have a direct role in their choices. This
probability Prob{a−i|Si, S−i, Y } is assumed to be observable since it can be directly identified from the
observations.
Lemma 1. Under assumption K, for some positive integer J the operator ΓJ constructed with the Bellman
operator
Γ(V ) (ι) = max
a∈A
 ∑
a−i∈A−i
u˘a (ι, a−i) Prob{a−i|ι}+ β
∫
V (ι◦) fI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι, a)%(dι◦)
 (14)
is a contraction on Bwα . Then the corresponding Bellman equation has a unique solution in Bwα such
that
Γ(V ∗) = V ∗.
Moreover, V (ι) and E [V (I◦i ) |ι, a] are continuous in ι.
Lemma 1 shows that the player’s problem has a unique solution when the stage game payoffs are
unbounded under the usual norm but bounded in w-norm. Intuitively the w-norm bound is a growth
restriction on the payoff functions under which there is some finite positive integer J such that ΓJ is a
contraction mapping. The contraction property is proven by an induction argument in Lippman (1975)
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which relies on assumption K.vi to bound in w-norm the distance between any two functions in Bwα .
Provided that (Bwα , ‖ · ‖wα) is a complete metric space, it follows by the Contraction Mapping Theorem
that ΓJ has a unique fixed point in Bwα . The continuity proof shows that the mapping in equation (14)
maps the set of continuous functions in Bwα into itself. Since this set is closed, the unique fixed point is
also a continuous function.19
Example 5. Assume that there is a scalar state variable, si, that evolves as an independent AR(1)
process, s◦i ∼ N(ρssi, σ2s) for parameters ρs and σs. Similarly let y◦ ∼ N(ρyy, σ2y) for parameters
ρy and σy, zij ∼ N(µzj , σ2zj ) for µzj , σzj and j = 1, 2, . . . , J , and εij ∼ N(µεj , σ2εj ) for µεj , σεj
and j = 0, 1, . . . , J .
Let the stage game payoffs be u˘j (si, y, zij , a−i, εij) = uj (a−i) + si + y + zij + εij with
|uj (a−i) | ≤ B <∞ for j ≥ 1 and u˘0 (y, εi0) = y + εi0.
Note that u¯j (si, s−i, y, zij) =
∑
a−i∈A−i uj (a−i) Prob {a−i| si, s−i, y} + si + y + zij where
Prob {a−i| si, s−i, y} = Prob{a−i|ι} because the private information of player i is not observed
by players other than i and assumption H holds. If α = 1 and w(si, s−i, y, zi·, εi·) = B + 1 +
s2i + y
2 +
∑J
j=1 z
2
ij +
∑J
j=0 ε
2
ij then assumption K.iv and K.v hold.
To see that assumption K.vi also holds, note that for ρs, ρy ∈ [−1, 1] and finite variances∫
w(ι◦)fI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι, j)%(dι◦)
= B + 1 + (ρssi)
2 + σ2s + (ρyy)
2 + σ2y +
J∑
j=1
[µ2zj + σ
2
zj ] +
J∑
j=0
[µ2εj + σ
2
εj ]
≤ B + 1 + s2i + y2 + b ≤ (w(ι) + b)
where b = σ2s + σ2y +
∑J
j=1[µ
2
zj + σ
2
zj ] +
∑J
j=0[µ
2
εj + σ
2
εj ] <∞.a
aThis example is partially borrowed from Norets (2010).
The present value of indefinitely choosing the outside option, v∗0 , can be solved without identifying
the vj’s for all j > 0 and a variation of lemma 1 also applies to v0 in equation (8). This guarantee that v0
also has a unique and continuous solution. Lemma 2 states these results for v0.
Lemma 2. Let u˘0 and q0 be known functions (assumptions C to E). Let FY ◦|Y be directly identified
(assumption I) and assume that assumption K holds when applied to the relevant objects for v0, i.e.
i. Y is a nonempty, complete, and separable metric space
ii. u˘0 : Y × R→ R is continuous in (y, ε0) ∈ Y × R
iii. There exist a continuous function w0 : (Y × R) → R, such that for all (y, ε0) ∈ (Y × R),
1 ≤ w0(y, ε0) <∞
iv. There exist a positive integer α such that ‖u˘0‖wα <∞
19Bhattacharya and Majumdar (1989) and Norets (2010) prove that the infinite summation of discounted expected payoffs of
an agent satisfies the Bellman equation, which is left out of the scope of this paper.
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v. There is a b ∈ (0,∞) such that for all (y, ε0) ∈ (Y × R), n = 1, 2, . . . α∫
w0(y
◦, ε◦0)
nfY ◦|Y (y◦|y) q0(ε◦0)%0(dy◦, dε◦0) ≤ (w(y, ε0) + b)n
vi. FY ◦|Y is weakly continuous on Y .
Then v0 in equation (8) has a unique solution v∗0 . Moreover, v∗0 is a continuous function.
At this point v∗0 is identified by lemma 2. A formal definition of identification helps to see this and
the task ahead. Recall that Pa : RJ → [0, 1] for all a ∈ A. Denote by P the space of functions
with typical element P = (P0, . . . , PJ)′, and let the set of relevant choice specific value functions be
V = (V0, . . . ,VJ) defined by equation (15).
V =
{
(v0, . . . , vJ) :
v0 is the unique solution for equation (8), and
for all a ≥ 1, va satisfies equation (7) for some P ∈ P
}
. (15)
Denote by U the set of stage game payoffs:
U = {(u0, . . . , uJ) : for all j, uj (·) satisfies assumptions A, C, D and K} .
Definition 1 (Identification). Let (v∗, P ∗, u∗) ∈ (V ×P × U) be the true functions to be identified and
D be the probability measure on (S × SN−1 × Y × Z1 × . . .×ZJ).
Then identification is obtained when:
• vj (·) = v∗j (·) a.s. with respect to the probability measure D.
• uj (·, a−i) = u∗j (·, a−i) a.s. with respect to the probability measure D for all a−i ∈ A−i.
• P = P ∗, i.e. for all j ∈ A, and ` ∈ RJ , Pj (`) = P ∗j (`) a.e. with respect to the Lebesgue measure
in RJ and a.s. with respect to the probability measure D.
Theorem 1 shows that under additional assumptions it is possible to identify a unique pair of functions
(P ∗, v∗) ∈ (P × V). The result depends on invertibility properties of P , which are established in
lemma 3.
Lemma 3. Let Pj : RJ → R, a, bj ∈ R for j = 0, . . . , J , −→a 0 = (a, . . . , a)′, −→a j = −→a 1 =
(−a, 0, . . . , 0)′ for j > 0, and
−→
b j = (bj − b0, . . . , bj − bj−1, bj − bj+1, . . . , bj − bJ)′ ,
for any 0 < j < J , with the corresponding changes for j = 0, J .
Denote (λ1, . . . , λJ) & (γ1, . . . , γJ) when for all j > 0, λj ≥ γj , and for at least a k ∈ {1, . . . , J},
λk > γk. Let m & m′ imply that Pj (m) 6= Pj(m′) for any j.
Then, Pj(
−→
b j) = Pj (
−→a j) for all j = 0, . . . , J , implies that b0 − bj = a for all j = 1, . . . , J .
Assumptions L and M ensure properties of the primitives of the model.
Assumption L. There is some s¯i ∈ S, s¯−i ∈ SN−1 such that
i. For j > 0, any y ∈ Y , and a−i ∈ AN−1, uj (s¯i, y,Zj , a−i) = R.
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ii. If for some j 6= 0, y ∈ Y and a−i ∈ AN−1 there is some zij , z˜ij ∈ Zj , such that
uj (s¯i, y, zij , a−i) ≤ uj (s¯i, y, z˜ij , a−i) , (16)
then for all a˜−i ∈ AN−1 equation (16) holds with a−i = a˜−i.
iii. If for some j 6= 0, zij ∈ Zj , and a−i ∈ AN−1 there is some y, y˜ ∈ Y , such that
uj (s¯i, y, zij , a−i) ≤ uj (s¯i, y˜, zij , a−i) , (17)
then for all a˜−i ∈ AN−1 equation (17) holds with a−i = a˜−i.
Assumption L provides sufficient conditions to guarantee that the choice specific value functions cover
a range sufficiently large to fully identify P ∗.
Assumption M. Assume that for all P ∈ P , and all a ∈ A,
i. Pa ( ·|S·, Y, Zi·) = Pa (·).
ii. Pa is continuous and strictly increasing.
Assumption M imposes restrictions on P ∗ that remove a possible direct dependence from the observ-
able variables and allow for its invertibility.
Theorem 1. Assume that u˘0 and q0 are known functions (assumptions C to E). Let assumption K hold
and FY ◦|Y be directly identified (assumption I). Then by lemma 2,
- For all v0 ∈ V0, v0 = v∗0 .
If in addition the known v∗0 is such that v∗0 (Y) = R, and assumptions A, F to H, J, L and M hold, then
- (v∗, P ∗) is identified within (V ×P)
The proof of theorem 1 first shows that P ∗ is identified on a subspace in which the vj’s attain 0 for
j ≥ 1. This argument holds by the range of the functions, properties in assumption L and the already
identified v∗0 . The v∗j ’s can be identified on a larger subspace mainly using the partial identification of P ∗,
the properties of P ∗ in lemma 3 and the broad range attained by v∗0 . Provided the exclusion restrictions on
the Zj’s (assumption A) and the conditional independence assumptions (assumption H), the variation of
the choice-specific value functions, ∆v(j)’s, on the mentioned larger subspace suffices to span the domain
of P ∗ and allow its identification. Finally, P ∗ can be inverted to identify ∆v∗(j) on the whole space.
IV.2 Identification of u∗j ’s and q∗
By assumption E, q∗0 is known and by theorem 1, P ∗ is identified, then it is also possible to identify q∗
and lemma 4 states this result.
Lemma 4. Under assumption H, if P ∗0 and q∗0 are provided, q∗ is identified.
The problem in lemma 4 reduces to a deconvolution argument because equation (12) holds and ε·0
is independent of ε·,−0 by assumption H. Knowing P ∗0 and q∗0 , the characteristic function of q∗−0 can be
identified and then q∗−0 and q∗ become known.
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The argument to identify the stage game payoff u∗j for j > 0 uses the (v∗, P ∗) already identified in
theorem 1. Equation (7) shows that the expected stage game payoff, u¯∗j for j > 0 can be identified using
the q∗ identified in lemma 4 and the choice specific value functions, v∗.
There are two key assumptions to identify uj , the exclusion restrictions in assumption A and the
support conditions in assumption B. Assumption A implies that the stage game payoffs of player i does
not depend on the state variables of other players, S−i after considering their actions, i.e. a−i. Then,
following Theorem 1 in Bajari, Chernozhukov, Hong, and Nekipelov (2009), the identification problem
can be reduced to a linear system of unknown uj’s, as in equation (18), which has a unique solution if
assumption B holds, i.e. the conditional distribution of the states S−i|si has at least (J + 1)N−1 points
in its support.
u¯ai (si, s−i, y, ziai) =E [uai (si, y, ziai , A−i)| si, s−i, y, ziai , ai]
=
∑
a−i∈A−i
uai (si, y, ziai , a−i) Prob {a−i|si, s−i, y} , (18)
where zi· is not observed by players other than i.20 Theorem 2 states the results in this section.
Theorem 2. Let assumption H hold and assume that v∗, P ∗0 and q∗0 are known, then the expected stage
game payoffs, u¯∗j for all j > 0 are identified.
If in addition, assumptions A to C hold and equation (18) defines at least (J + 1)N−1 linearly inde-
pendent equations almost surely, then the stage game payoffs uj for all j > 0 are identified for almost
every point in their support.
The proof of theorem 2 is omitted because it follows directly from the result in lemma 4 and equa-
tion (7). Besides, the final statement in theorem 2 is analogous to the rank condition of an ordinary least
square regression with Prob {a−i|si, ·, y} for all a−i as explanatory variables and u¯ai (si, ·, y, ziai) as the
dependent one.
Theorems 1 and 2 summarize the identification strategy for the objects of interest in definition 1.
V Conclusions
The setup of this model has a variety of applications where stochastic dynamic discrete choice models
are useful to study agents’ simultaneous intertemporal decisions in an infinite horizon. There is a finite
number of players who are forward-looking and choose among available alternatives to optimize their
own payoffs. This is a game of incomplete information where the players receive private information, i.e.
the “shocks”, and can be heterogeneous. Every period, the players face an individual decision-making
20
Prob {a−i|si, s−i, y} =
∏N−1
n=1
∏
bn∈A
I((b1, . . . , bn, . . . , bN−1) = a−i)∫
P ∗bn
(
∆v∗(bn) (s·, y, zn·)
)
FZ·|S·Y (dzn·|s· y).
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process after observing their own “shocks” and the public information. The current actions of a player
affect his own current and future payoffs, which are also affected by other players’ actions and the random
evolution of state variables that may depend on the joint (past) actions of all players.
This paper presents a new nonparametric identification result that allows for unknown stage game
payoff for all but one alternative and also unknown joint distribution of the private information with
shocks that can be dependent across alternatives and have different marginal distributions. The result
is proved under the assumption that players are playing a single equilibrium and the private shocks are
independent over time and across players.
This new nonparametric identification strategy allows the researcher to disregard arbitrary assump-
tions on the distribution of the private information across alternatives. Thus, the model can represent
different and unknown distributions of the shocks for each alternative, which for instance can be more
relevant when the alternatives represent different types of business strategies.
Instead of assuming parametric payoff functions and known distributions of the shocks, some key
information for the identification strategy comes from the outside option. The payoff for this alternative
is assumed to respond to exogenous variations in the “states of the economy”, for instance the reader can
think of an economy with macroeconomic fluctuations. In this sense, the assumptions required in this
model are more general than the available ones in the literature, with some variations used to overcome
the nonparametric non-identification results in Rust (1994) and Magnac and Thesmar (2002).
The identification strategy relies on exclusion restrictions across the payoff functions, the known out-
side option’s payoffs and properties of the joint distribution of the private information in differences.
The model does not need parametric assumptions on the unknown stage game payoff functions of the
alternatives, except for the assumptions on the outside option’s payoffs.
This identification strategy allows the researcher to explore questions that would not be possible to
answer under parametric methods. For instance, if a simplifying assumption about the joint distribution
of the private information across alternatives would yield similar results or policy implications to the
more general (unknown) case. Thus instead of assuming a joint distribution of the private information
or imposing parametric assumptions for all payoff functions, the researcher can learn the shapes of these
objects among a large class of functions. Since the consistency of the estimators derived from structural
models usually depends on the accuracy of their assumptions, this nonparametric identification result
makes possible to reduce some of these concerns checking for robustness.
Finally, the result is an example of a nonparametric identification strategy that relaxes assumptions
hard to justify in applications. In this type of dynamic discrete choice models there is an already known
nonparametric non-identification result, hence under the standard setup all assumptions cannot be jointly
relaxed and the identification strategy in this paper proposes key modifications to overcome the difficulties
that the literature has found. Different assumptions could be more plausible than others and changes in
the setup of the model lead to customized identification strategies that can shed light on questions that
would otherwise be difficult to answer.
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Appendix
Proofs
Lemma 1
Proof. The proof of the contraction property of ΓJ is given in Lippman (1975) and extended by
Norets (2010). The main arguments of the proof are as follow. Pick V1, V2 ∈ Bwα
|[Γ(V1)− Γ(V2)] (ι)| =
∣∣∣∣maxa∈A
{
u¯a (ι) + β
∫
V1 (ι
◦) fI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι, a)%(dι◦)
}
−max
a∈A
{
u¯a (ι) + β
∫
V2 (ι
◦) fI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι, a)%(dι◦)
}∣∣∣∣
≤ max
a∈A
∣∣∣∣{u¯a (ι) + β ∫ V1 (ι◦) fI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι, a)%(dι◦)}
−
{
u¯a (ι) + β
∫
V2 (ι
◦) fI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι, a)%(dι◦)
}∣∣∣∣
≤ βmax
a∈A
{∫
|V1 − V2| (ι◦) fI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι, a)%(dι◦)
}
≤ βmax
a∈A
{∫
‖V1 − V2‖wα w(ι◦)αfI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι, a)%(dι◦)
}
The first inequality follows from a property of the maximum operator, the following line is true due to a
property of the absolute values of integrals and the last inequality applies by the definition of thew-norm.
|[Γ(V1)− Γ(V2)] (ι)| ≤ β ‖V1 − V2‖wα max
a∈A
{∫
w(ι◦)αfI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι, a)%(dι◦)
}
≤ β ‖V1 − V2‖wα (w(ι) + b)α (19)
The last inequality follows by assumption K.vi. Lippman (1975), pag. 1228-1229, shows by induction
that equation (19) implies∥∥ΓJ(V1)− ΓJ(V2)∥∥wα ≤ βJ (1 + Jb)α ‖V1 − V2‖wα .
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To see the argument let
∣∣Γ2 ◦ . . . ◦ Γn+1(V1 − V2) (ι)∣∣ ≤ βn ‖V1 − V2‖wα (w(ι) + nb)α, then∣∣Γ[Γ2 ◦ . . . ◦ Γn+1(V1 − V2)] (ι)∣∣ ≤ βmax
a∈A
{∫ ∣∣Γ2 ◦ . . . ◦ Γn+1(V1 − V2)∣∣ (ι◦)
fI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι, a)%(dι◦)
}
≤ βn+1 ‖V1 − V2‖wα max
a∈A
{∫
(w (ι◦) + nb)α
fI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι, a)%(dι◦)
}
= βn+1 ‖V1 − V2‖wα max
a∈A
{
α∑
i=0
(
α
i
)
(nb)α−i
∫
w (ι◦)i
fI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι, a)%(dι◦)
}
≤ βn+1 ‖V1 − V2‖wα
α∑
i=0
(
α
i
)
(nb)α−i (w(ι) + b)i
= βn+1 ‖V1 − V2‖wα (w(ι) + (n+ 1)b)α ,
where the last inequality follows by assumption K.vi and finally the induction hypothesis is verified.
By assumption K.iv,
∥∥Γ1 ◦ . . . ◦ Γn(V1 − V2)∥∥wα ≤ βn ‖V1 − V2‖wα (1 + nb)α thus ΓJ is a con-
traction for some finite J , since for J large enough βJ (1 + Jb)α < 1. By the Contraction Mapping
Theorem, assumption K.i and provided that (Bwα , ‖ · ‖wα) is a complete metric space (see Proposition
7.2.1 in Herna´ndez-Lerma, 1999), then ΓJ has a unique fixed point in Bwα .
To show continuity, let C be the set of continuous functions and pick V ∈ C ∩ Bwα . To see that
the unique fixed point of the mapping ΓJ is a continuous function it is enough to show that Γ : C → C
because C is closed and C ⊂ Bwα . Thus for V ∈ C and ι1, ι2 ∈ I note that
|Γ(V ) (ι1)− Γ(V ) (ι2)| ≤ max
a∈A
∣∣∣∣{u¯a (ι1) + β ∫ V (ι◦) fI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι1, a)%(dι◦)}
−
{
u¯a (ι2) + β
∫
V (ι◦) fI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι2, a)%(dι◦)
}∣∣∣∣
≤ max
a∈A
|u¯a (ι1)− u¯a(ι2)|
+ βmax
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∫ V (ι◦) fI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι1, a)%(dι◦)
−
∫
V (ι◦) fI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι2, a)%(dι◦)
∣∣∣∣
(20)
Provided assumptions K.ii and K.iii, u¯a is continuous for all a ∈ A. Therefore, given any  > 0 there is
a δ1 such that ‖ι1 − ι2‖ < δ1 implies max
a∈A
|u¯a(ι1)− u¯a(ι2)| < /2.
Arguments similar to the proof of Lemma 8.5.5 (a) in Herna´ndez-Lerma (1999) are useful to show that
the continuation value,
∫
V (ι◦)F I◦|I,A(dι◦|ι, a), is a continuous function. Define υw ≡ V +‖V ‖wα wα.
By definition of the norm and assumption K.iv, υw is a non-negative function in Bwα , then there is a
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nondecreasing sequence of measurable bounded functions υk such that υk ↑ υw. By assumption K.vii,
F I◦|I,A is weakly continuous then let ιn → ι to see that
lim inf
n→∞
∫
υw (ι
◦)F I◦|I,A(dι◦|ιn, a) ≥ lim inf
n→∞
∫
υk (ι
◦)F I◦|I,A(dι◦|ιn, a)
=
∫
υk (ι
◦)F I◦|I(dι◦|ι, a).
Let k →∞, then by the Monotone Convergence Theorem
lim inf
n→∞
∫
υw (ι
◦)F I◦|I,A(dι◦|ιn, a) ≥
∫
υw (ι
◦)F I◦|I,A(dι◦|ι, a)
Therefore
∫
υw (ι
◦)F I◦|I,A(dι◦|·, a) is l.s.c. which together with assumption K.iv and K.vii gives that
for all V ∈ C ∩ Bwα ,
∫
V (ι◦)F I◦|I,A(dι◦|ι, a) is l.s.c. on I. To see that the continuation value is upper
semi-continuous, pick −V (in place of V ) and note that by the later result ∫ −V (ι◦)F I◦|I,A(dι◦|ι, a) is
also l.s.c. on I. Since, the continuation value is both upper and l.s.c., then it is continuous on I.
Pick any  > 0, then by continuity of the continuation value there is a δ2 such that ‖ι1 − ι2‖ < δ2
implies max
a∈A
∣∣∫ V (ι◦) fI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι1, a)%(dι◦)− ∫ V (ι◦) fI◦|I,A(ι◦|ι2, a)%(dι◦)∣∣ < 2β . Coming back to
equation (20), note that for any  > 0 there is a δ = min{δ1, δ2} such that ‖ι1 − ι2‖ < δ implies
|Γ(V ) (ι1)− Γ(V ) (ι2)| < . Thus Γ(V ) is a continuous function.
Lemma 2
Proof. The proof of lemma 2 is analogous to the more general case proved for lemma 1.
Lemma 3
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that b0 − bj 6= a for some j and without loss of generality (wlog)
let j = 2. If maxj(b0 − bj) ≤ a and b0 − b2 < a then P0(−→b 0) 6= P0 (−→a 0) by assumption. If
maxj(b0 − bj) > a and wlog b0 − b1 = maxj(b0 − bj), then P1(−→b 1) 6= P1(−→a 1) because b1 − bj ≤ 0
for j > 2 and b1 − b0 < −a. Therefore, it cannot be true that b0 − b2 6= a when Pj(−→b j) = Pj (−→a j) for
all j = 0, . . . , J .
Theorem 1
Proof. Suppose that (v, P ) ∈ (V ×P) and for all j ∈ A,
Pj (si, s−i, y, zi·; (v, P )) = Pj (si, s−i, y, zi·; (v∗, P ∗)) a.s. (D) .
Then by assumption M.i,
Pj
(
∆v(j) (si, s−i, y, zi·)
)
= P ∗j
(
∆v∗(j) (si, s−i, y, zi·)
)
a.s. (D) .
By Lemmas 1 and 2, for all j, vj is continuous on I. Since Pj and P ∗j are continuous (assumption M.ii)
and v, v∗ are continuous, it follows that for all (s·, y, zi·) ∈ (S· × Y × Z·),
Pj
(
∆v(j) (s·, y, zi·)
)
= P ∗j
(
∆v∗(j) (s·, y, zi·)
)
. (21)
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Provided assumption A and assumptions L.i and L.ii, it follows that u¯j (s¯i, s¯−i, y,Zj) = R for any j ∈ A,
y ∈ Y . Note that the continuation value in equation (7) does not depend onZ·, see assumption H, then for
all j, it follows that vj (s¯i, s¯−i, y,Zj) = R. Therefore, for each j there is at least a function ζvj : Y → R,
such that for each y ∈ Y ,
vj
(
s¯i, s¯−i, y, ζvj (y)
)
= 0. (22)
Consider a first case for all (s¯·, y, ζv·(y)) ∈
(
{s¯·} × Y ×
∏J
j=1
{
ζvj (Y)
})
, then by equation (21) it
follows that for all j ∈ A,
Pj
(
∆v(j) (s¯·, y, ζv·(y))
)
= P ∗j
(
∆v∗(j) (s¯·, y, ζv·(y))
)
, (23)
where by equation (22),
∆v(0) (s¯i, s¯−i, y, ζv·(y)) = (v0 (y)− v1 (s¯i, s¯−i, y, ζv1(y)) , . . . , v0 (y)− vJ (s¯i, s¯−i, y, ζvJ (y)))
= (v0 (y) , . . . , v0 (y)) ,
and for all J > j > 1,
∆v(j)(s¯i, s¯−i, y, ζv·(y)) =(vj(s¯i, s¯−i, y, ζvj (y))− v0(y), vj(s¯i, s¯−i, y, ζvj (y)) (24)
− v1(s¯i, s¯−i, y, ζv1(y)), . . . , vj(s¯i, s¯−i, y, ζvj (y))
− vJ(s¯i, s¯−i, y, ζvJ (y)))
=(−v0(y), 0, . . . , 0).
The analogous to equation (24), with the straightforward modifications, also holds for j = 1, J .
By Lemma 2, for all v0 ∈ V0, v0 = v∗0 , thus equations (22) and (23) imply that for all (s¯·, y, ζv·(y)) ∈(
{s¯·} × Y ×
∏J
j=1
{
ζvj (Y)
})
and j ∈ A,
Pj
(
∆v∗(j) (s¯·, y, ζv·(y))
)
= Pj (s¯i, s¯−i, y, ζv·(y); (v∗, P ∗)) .
Therefore, P ∗ is identified on
(
{s¯·} × Y ×
∏J
j=1
{
ζvj (Y)
})
.
Consider a second and last case for some y ∈ Y and zi· /∈
∏J
j=1
{
ζvj (y)
}
such that for all j,
Pj
(
∆v(j) (s¯i, s¯−i, y, zi·)
)
= Pj (s¯i, s¯−i, y, zi·; (v∗, P ∗)) .
In this second case, w.l.o.g., first proceed identifying v∗1 (s¯i, s¯−i, y, zi1) as follows. Recall that vj (s¯i, s¯−i, y,Zj) =
R, for all j, y and given assumption L.iii, pick for all j 6= 1 some zˆj ∈Zj , y˜ ∈ Y and z˜i· ∈
∏J
j=1
{
ζvj (y˜)
}
such that for all j
P ∗j
(
∆v(j) (s¯i, s¯−i, y, zi1, zˆi2, . . . , zˆiJ)
)
= Pj (s¯i, s¯−i, y˜, z˜i·; (v∗, P ∗)) .
The result for the first case guarantees that P ∗j
(
∆v∗(j) (s¯i, s¯−i, y˜, ζv·(y˜))
)
= Pj (s¯i, s¯−i, y˜, z˜i·; (v∗, P ∗))
for all j, so
P ∗j
(
∆v(j) (s¯i, s¯−i, y, zi1, zˆi2, . . . , zˆiJ)
)
= P ∗j
(
∆v∗(j) (s¯i, s¯−i, y˜, z˜i·)
)
(25)
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By lemma 3 and assumption M, equation (25) implies ∆v(j) (s¯i, s¯−i, y, zi1, zˆi2, . . . , zˆiJ) = ∆v∗(j) (s¯i, s¯−i, y˜, z˜i·)
for all j and in particular v1 (s¯i, s¯−i, y, zi1)−v0 (y) = v∗1 (s¯i, s¯−i, y˜, z˜i1)−v∗0 (y˜). Then v1 (s¯i, s¯−i, y, zi1) =
v0 (y)−v∗0 (y˜) and the identification result follows since v0 = v∗0 by Lemma 2. The analogous arguments
apply to vj (s¯i, s¯−i, y, zij) for all j, then all choice specific values functions are identified for arbitrary
y ∈ Y and zi· /∈
∏J
j=1
{
ζvj (y)
}
.
Combining the first and second cases, v∗j (·) is identified on ({s¯·}×Y ×Z·) for all j > 0. Recall that
for all y ∈ Y , vj (s¯i, s¯−i, y,Zj) = R, and by assumption, the range of the known v∗0 is also the reals,
i.e. v∗0 (Y) = R, then P ∗ is identified. Since P ∗ is invertible (see proposition 1 in Hotz and Miller 1993)
and identified, the mapping ∆v∗(j)(·) is identified for all j on (SN ×Y ×Z·). Finally by lemma 2, v∗0 is
known, thus the levels, v∗j (·) are also identified for all j on (SN × Y × Z·).
Lemma 4
Proof. Recall that εi,−0 and εi0 are independent, define p0 (∆ν) = ∂JP0 (∆ν) /∂∆ν1...∂∆νJ , i.e.
the joint probability density function of ∆ε(0)i = εi,−0 − εi0 · 1J , and note that
P0 (∆ν) =
∫
R
(∫ ∆ν1+0
−∞
...
∫ ∆νJ+0
−∞
q−0 (y−0) q0 (0) dy1...dyJ
)
d0
p0 (∆ν) =
∫
R
q−0 (∆ν1 + 0, . . . ,∆νJ + 0) q0 (0) d0.
Hence, the problem of identifying q−0 is a deconvolution problem. For an arbitrary density function f ,
denote its Fourier transform by φf , thus
φp0 (t1, . . . , tJ) ≡
∫
RJ
ei
∑J
a=1 ta∆νap0 (∆ν) d∆ν = E
[
ei
∑J
a=1 taaei
∑J
a=1 ta(−0)
]
= E
[
ei
∑J
a=1 taa
]
E
[
e
i0
(∑J
a=1−ta
)]
= φq−0 (t1, . . . , tJ)φq0
(∑J
a=1 − ta
)
.
Provided that P0 and q0 are known, φq−0 is identified
φq−0 (t) = φp0 (t)/φq0
(∑J
a=1 − ta
)
.
Finally, q−0 is identified from its characteristic function φq−0 as follows
q−0 (α1, . . . , αJ) =
1
(2pi)J
∫
RJ
ei
∑J
a=1 taαaφq−0 (t) dt,
and q (α0, . . . , αJ) = q−0 (α1, . . . , αJ) q0 (α0).
On the existence of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in dynamic games with unbounded pay-
offs
Regarding the theoretical foundations for the existence of equilibriums in dynamic Markov stochastic
games of incomplete information, the literature has made relevant progress, although there are not gen-
eral results that guarantee such existence and consequently no extensions with unbounded stage game
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payoffs (see Dutta and Sundaram (1998) for further details about some difficulties). The available results
about the existence of MPE in stochastic dynamic games require for instance bounded reward functions,
compact state spaces (or both), zero-sum frameworks or the so-called maximin strategies. Among the
partial results available for the Markov-perfect equilibrium framework, Parthasarathy (1982) studies the
existence of Markov perfect equilibrium in discounted stochastic games assuming finite action sets. Un-
der strong separability assumptions on the stage payoffs and continuity of the transition probabilities and
the reward functions, Parthasarathy (1982) shows that the existence of a p–equilibrium21 in Markovian
strategies implies the existence of an equilibrium in stationary (Markov) strategies when the state space
is uncountable and compact. The results in Parthasarathy (1982) have some remarkable restrictions since
the state space is compact, the stage game payoffs and the transition function are additive separable in the
actions and a p–equilibrium may not exists if the state space is not countable. Nowak (1985) pursues an
alternative approach and proves the existence of an “approximate equilibrium” concept, the ε–equilibria,
in stationary strategies in infinite horizon Markovian game. The idea is to approximate the original game
by a sequence of finite or countable state games which can be as close as the original game as desired.
Nowak (1985)’s result requires bounded reward functions, and a partition of the state space such that its
elements are countable with constant values for the transition probabilities and reward functions.22
Dynamic Markovian games have been an active topic in applied and theoretical research which is
still under development. Recently, Levy (2013) provides an example of a game that satisfies the as-
sumptions used in positive results (for special cases) on the existence of stationary Markov equilibrium
and shows that the game has a stationary approximate MPE, but it does not have a MPE. Matkowski
and Nowak (2011) develops the idea of k–local contractions in Rinco´n-Zapatero and Rodrı´guez-Palmero
(2003, 2009)23 and proves results for the existence of a unique solution to the Bellman equation in a dis-
counted stochastic dynamic programming model with unbounded returns, but this existence result was
not extended to Markovian games. Duggan (2012) proves the existence of a stationary Markov perfect
equilibrium in noisy stochastic games with bounded stage game playoffs. The noise is assumed public
and this is a key element to derive the result in Duggan (2012).24 Jas´kiewicz and Nowak (2011a) develops
an alternative approach to prove the existence of an optimal stationary policy in discounted dynamic pro-
gramming problems with unbounded returns and uncountable state space. The work of Jas´kiewicz and
Nowak (2011a) prove the convergence of a value iteration algorithm to a solution to the Bellman equation,
but such solution is not necessarily unique and the results were not extended to Markovian games.
Some existence results are available for Markov zero-sum stochastic games with unbounded payoffs.
In a zero-sum two players’ game, Jas´kiewicz and Nowak (2006) proves a minimax theorem25 with optimal
stationary strategies for the players. Ku¨enle (2007) proves the existence of an optimal stationary strategy
for the maximizing player, and an ε–optimal stationary strategy for the minimizing player. Jas´kiewicz
and Nowak (2011b) studies further the stochastic Markov game with unbounded payoffs under maximin
21A p–equilibriumis a strategy profile in which each player’s strategy is a best-response to the profile from p–almostevery
initial state, where pis a given probability measure on the state space.
22Moreover, the transition probabilities must admit a density function with respect to some measure on the state space and
this density function must be continuous in the players actions.
23Rinco´n-Zapatero and Rodrı´guez-Palmero (2003, 2009) studies a deterministic dynamic programing problem.
24The noise in Duggan (2012) is not directly affected by the previous period’s state and actions.
25Under a minimax setup a player considers a range of models and chooses the alternative that minimizes his loss given by
the worst possible case.
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strategies and the zero-sum setup. In this later case, Jas´kiewicz and Nowak (2011b) proves that the max-
imizer has optimal stationary strategy whereas the minimizer has an ε–optimal semi-stationary one for
any ε > 0.
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